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Abstract. Theoretical exposition and empirical evidence in central bank independence (CBI)
literature conﬁrm an inverse relationship between inﬂation and measures of CBI mostly in
developed economies. Based on this ex ante information on CBI-inﬂation tradeoﬀ, this paper
proposes two functional forms for the diagonal and oﬀ diagonal elements in the residual
covariance matrix in the estimation process. The proposed functional forms are used in a
generalized maximum likelihood and then in a generalized least squares (GLS) (with the
restricted covariance matrix) framework for the empirical test. The results are compared to the
outcome of an SUR model (unrestricted). The tests involve 14 emerging economies and covers
the period 1960–1990. Compared to SUR, majority of results of GLS model in samples with
and without outliers provide stronger and more signiﬁcant evidence conﬁrming the CBIinﬂation tradeoﬀ. Notably, the standard errors of the GLS estimates are lower than that of the
SUR estimates. Without outliers, the GLS estimates show even lower standard errors as
compared to the outcome of the SUR model. Low standard errors provide baseline indication
of more accurate estimates.
Keywords: emerging economies, inﬂation, generalized least squares, central bank independence
JEL Codes: C51, E58
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1. Introduction
Bekaert and Campbell (2002) provide an overview of the existing research on
emerging economies. An area not quite adequately addressed in the literature
on emerging economies is the reform of monetary policy institutions and its
impact on the behavior of ﬁnancial and economic variables. The present
study contributes to this apparent gap in the literature on emerging economies by investigating the inﬂuence of the varying measures central bank
independence (CBI) on inﬂation rates.
Theoretical and empirical expositions provide support for an inverse
relationship between the measures of CBI and the level and stability of
inﬂation. Published works by Alesina and Summers (1993), and Cukierman
et al. (1992) among others provide empirical evidence to support the inverse
relationship between CBI levels and inﬂation rate. Relatively low and stable
inﬂation is expected in high CBI economies. Other recent empirical studies by
Neyapti (2003), Diana and Sidiropoulos (2004), Down (2004) and Siklos
(2004), among others, also conﬁrm the trade oﬀ between inﬂation rates and
the levels of CBI.
This paper extends the above studies to emerging economies, which are
considered the new ‘frontierÕ energizing world economic growth. In this
study, and in line with existing work, the measures of CBI employed are
CukiermanÕs turnover rates (TOR). TOR measures the rate of change of chief
executives of a nationÕs central bank. The latter measures are considered
appropriate gauges of realistic degrees of CBI in relatively new democracies
and developing worlds rather than the ‘legalÕ measures of CBI.1 Reason for
the latter is that in emerging economies, actual operational independence
tends to deviate from the ‘legalÕ independence indicated in the central bank
charter. The outcome of empirical studies by Cukierman et al. (1992) and
Cukierman et al. (1993) provide support for this view.
This paper proposes two functional forms for the diagonal and oﬀ diagonal elements in the residual covariance matrix in the estimation process. We
directly incorporate the ex ante information of a CBI-inﬂation tradeoﬀ into
the estimation process. This aﬀords the opportunity to better capture the
inﬂuence of CBI and possibly improve test estimates. The proposed functional forms are used in a generalized maximum likelihood and then a generalized least squares (GLS) framework for empirical tests. The results are
compared to the outcome of an SUR model which is the most commonly
used procedure in current CBI studies.
Compared to SUR, results of GLS model in samples with and without
outliers provide stronger and more signiﬁcant evidence conﬁrming the CBIinﬂation tradeoﬀ. Again, unlike SUR, results of a majority of the nations in
the GLS model support the expected inverse CBI-inﬂation relationship.
Notably, the standard errors of the GLS estimates are lower than that of the
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SUR estimates. Low standard errors provide baseline indication of more
accurate estimates.
The rest of the paper is presented as follows, brief review of the literature
on CBI, presentation of the model, empirical work, discussion and the
conclusions.

2. Review of evidence on central bank independence
Alesina and Summers (1993), and Cukierman et al. (1992) among others
provide empirical evidence to support the afore-mentioned inverse relationship between CBI levels and inﬂation rate. The inﬂuence of central banks on
inﬂation may be attributed to Kydland and PrescottÕs (1977). Their paper
posits the notion of dynamic time inconsistencies resulting from discretionary
policies which tend to undermine the credibility of policy makers and result
in an inﬂationary bias. To control this policy discrepancy and the uncertainty
it creates, the authors argue that the adoption of rules can reduce the bias
over time. These rules may be enforceable through institutional arrangements
and can restrict policymakersÕ latitude to use inﬂation to meet revenue needs
and thereby enhance the level of independence of the central bank.
Barro and Gordon (1983) also suggest that the monetary authorities can
build a reputation of credibility by sticking to rules that keep inﬂation low.
The reputation can ultimately substitute for formal rules. Backus and Driﬃll
(1985) extended Barro and Gordon (1983) by examining the role a central
bankÕs reputation plays in the determination inﬂation levels. They suggest
symmetry between CBI and its reputation and assert that the former can
serve as a pre-commitment device. Other writers including Bade and Parkin
(1985) and Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Lohmann (1992), Debelle and
Fischer (1994) and Schellekens (2002), extend the basic idea of Kydland and
PrescottÕs notion of ‘rulesÕ and their impact on the behavior of central
bankers.
Empirical studies by Banaian and Willett (1983),2 Bade and Parkin (1985),
Grilli et al. (1991), Cukierman et al. (1992), Cukierman et al. (1993), Alesina
and Summers (1993) and Eijﬃnger and de Haan (1996) Dolmas et al. (2000),
Neyapti (2003), Diana and Sidiropoulos (2004), Down (2004) and Siklos
(2004), among others, conﬁrm the trade oﬀ between inﬂation rate and CBI.
In another CBI-Inﬂation tradeoﬀ test, Spiegel (1998) attempts to record the
announcement eﬀect of the May 6th, 1997 decision to enhance the independence of the British central bank, the Bank of England. He reports a ‘34
basis pointÕ drop in the one day event window and a ‘60 basis pointÕ decrease
in a 2-week event window of the average expected inﬂation estimates of longterm maturities. These results tend not only to reinforce the CBI-Inﬂation
tradeoﬀ but may also provide impetus for the adoption of CBI independence
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related enhancements in central banks around the world including emerging
economies. The growing inﬂuence of emerging nations in the global economy
and the increasing adoption of measures to enhance levels of CBI provide a
strong motivation for this study.

3. Data
Inﬂation data for the countries in this study are obtained from the international ﬁnancial statistics CD-Rom published by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Fourteen emerging nations are involved in this study.3 The
choice of countries is largely driven by both the availability of data over the
period of this study which is from 1960 to 1989. The measures of CBI are
provided by Cukierman (1992) from 1950 to 1989. The measure of CBI this
study uses is the turnover rate (hereafter, TOR) of the heads of central banks
of respective countries. This measure is presented as a more practical indication of the actual level of CBI in developing economies. Political and
institutional realities in most developing economies are still evolving thereby
rendering legal measures a poor indicator of level of CBI. Cukierman (1992)
further argues that the more frequently a governor of the central bank is
changed, especially within a political electoral cycle, the more vulnerable the
monetary policymaker will be to political inﬂuences. In eﬀect, high levels of
TOR correspond to lower levels of independence of the respective central
bank. This is a generalization with the usual caveat that this observation does
not hold in every situation. Empirical evidence conﬁrms that TOR performs
better as an estimate of the CBI of a developing country than legal measures
(Cukierman 1992; Cukierman et al. 1993).

4. Central bank independence and maximum likelihood (ML) estimation
CBI may be characterized as information known to inﬂuence the interrelationship of variables in an economy. This means that the error terms are also
aﬀected, implying that the structure of the covariance matrix is conditioned
by the degree of CBI. This paper argues that this ex ante information can be
used to better capture the inﬂuence of CBI on inﬂation. However, the exact
functional form is unknown. The eﬀort of this paper is to propose a form
that impounds the ex ante empirical and theoretical knowledge that inﬂation
varies inversely with measures of CBI. This will put to better use the prior
information available on the variables. To this end, this paper goes beyond
the least squares models and adopts a generalized maximum likelihood and
GLS framework for estimation. This approach allows for the direct modeling
of relationship between CBI and the elements in residual covariance matrix.
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For simplicity consider an SUR variation of a generalized maximum
likelihood model (hereafter referred to as GML) estimation of a two equation
system representing say two countries:


ð1:0Þ
ln L ¼ n= lnð2pÞ  n=2 ln jRj  ð1=2Þ e21 =r211 þ e22 =r222
where e21 and e22 represent the error terms of a system of two equations
representing countries 1 and 2 and are weighted by the respective variances, i.e. r211 and r222 and S is the variance–covariance matrix of the
model.
To capture the inﬂuence of CBI in the estimation process, and speciﬁcally
in the residual covariance matrix, this paper deﬁnes all elements in S in
equation (1.0) in terms of CBI measures. This GML estimator will simultaneously optimize over both measures, thereby allowing these parameters to
appropriately impound the eﬀect of CBI in the estimation process. This
procedure amounts to the conditioning of the disturbance terms and its
moments to ensure that the GML estimator optimally accounts for the
inﬂuence of the varying degrees of CBI measures.

5. Proposed functional form
The objective of this exercise is to use the information contained in the CBIÕs
of countries, for example i and j, and inﬂation moments to predict elements
in S of equation (1.0).4
The behavior of rij, rii and rjj, the covariance and variance of countries
i and j, are postulated as being a function of CBI measures. A central condition that must be considered in determining a functional form that can
capture this proposition is the need to maintain the positive semi-deﬁniteness
of the variance covariance matrix (VCV).
Based on CBI literature and Sintim-Aboagye and Tufte (2006) the paper
proposes that elements of the VCV are likely to be inversely related to the
level of CBIÕs in countryÕs i and j. Adapting this expectation to TOR as a
measure of CBI, the paper proposes the following formulation for the variance of inﬂation residuals in the covariance matrix,5
rii ¼ eðb0 Þ  TORi  TORi

ð1:1Þ

eðb0 Þ is used to scale equation (1.1) to match inﬂation variances which should
be strictly positive.6 Equation (1.1) deﬁnes the variances in terms of the
product of TORs of country i. In this expression, the coeﬃcient is directly
weighted by the measures of CBI, i.e. TOR. Since higher TORs means lower
levels of independence, the formulation imply that lower levels of CBI results
in increases in the variances of inﬂation (rii).
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When both the variance and covariance elements are multiplied by the
same scale factor jRj ¼ 0. To ensure that jRj > 0, a diﬀerent scale factor needs
to be used, and since residual covariance are generally known to be smaller
than the residual variances within a country, we scale down by dividing by
egðCBIi ;CBIj ) þ 1 to obtain the covariance;
rij ¼

eðb0 Þ  TORi  TORj
ðeðb1 Þ þ 1Þ

ð1:2Þ

where the expression egðCBIi ;CBIj ) þ 1 in essence serves as a scale factor to
ensure positive deﬁniteness of the VCV.
Functionally, the term on the RHS of (1.2) accounts for the inﬂuence of
the levels of CBI, as measured by TOR, on the degree of association between
the variables of the two countries.
Expressions (1.1) and (1.2) are proposed as the general framework of
speciﬁc functional forms that represent the relationship between the residual
variability of inﬂation and the respective CBI measure. These proposed forms
then are incorporated into the S, of a generalized maximum likelihood model
like the following:
ln L ¼ m=2 lnð2pÞ  1=2 ln jRj  ð1=2Þ½Y  XBÞ0 R1 ðY  XBÞ

ð1:3Þ

where the Ys, Xs and Bs represent dependent and independent variables and
parameters in the set of m regression equations.
First, the study estimates equations (1.1) and (1.2) and obtain point
estimates of ‘bÕs for a small cross-section of countries to form a ﬁxed S for use
in GLS estimation. The newly constructed matrix, S, is referred to as SCBI as
an alternative to S used in the GLS estimation of equation (1.3). With
equations (1.1) and (1.2) as the diagonal and oﬀ-diagonal elements of SCBI
for countries i and j and with their respective CBIs, we obtain the following
VCV matrix,

 3
2
^
eðb0 Þ  TORi  TORj
ðb^0 Þ
^
7
6 e  TORi  TORi
ðeðb1 Þ þ1Þ
7


ð1:4Þ
RCBI ¼ 6
5
4 eðb^0 Þ  TORi  TORj
ðb^o Þ
e  TORj  TORj
ðb^1 Þ
ðe

þ1Þ

where the circumﬂex indicates a GML point estimate. GLS estimates from a
larger sample of countries will then be formed by substituting SCBI for S in a
GLS estimator below.
 0
1 0 1
ð1:5Þ
X ðRGLS  IÞY
B^GLS ¼ X ðR1
GLS  IÞ
GLS estimates are reported later.
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6. Empirical results and discussion
Technical restrictions limit the number of countries in the initial GML
estimation process to three. Within this restriction, eﬀort is made to achieve a
measure of broad applicability. Egypt, Colombia and India are used to
obtain the initial GML estimates. Even though there is no additional
restriction that the TOR indexes of countries in the initial GML estimation
vary, it is desirable. The idea is to better capture how changes in the TOR
relate to the behavior of the level and variability of inﬂation.
As a ﬁrst step, we follow existing practice in CBI empirical work and
adopt the following regression model for the initial two tests,
Yi ¼ a0 + a1  TORi þ a2  Yiðt1Þ

ð1:6Þ

where i represent a country and Yi(t–1) captures the persistence of inﬂation.
One out of the three countries in the initial test, India, conﬁrms
CukiermanÕs (1992) ﬁndings of the existence of the hypothesized positive
relationship between inﬂation and TOR. Speciﬁcally, it shows that lower
levels of independence, i.e. higher TOR, result in higher the inﬂation.
However, contrary to expectations results of Egypt and Colombia indicate
that higher levels of independence lead to high inﬂation rates.
Interpretation of the ‘bÕs is more problematic, since the ‘logistic formÕ
suggests no economically meaningful restrictions that can be placed on these
coeﬃcients. The estimates serve as weights in the VCV matrix for the GLS
estimation.
The next step is to specify the parameters in the new RCBI . This entails the
use of values of the covariance parameters estimated above in a GML procedure (Table Ia). Based on equations (1.1) and (1.2), and estimates from
Table Ia, is the matrix to be used in the GLS estimation of a larger sample of
countries;
3
2
1:65
TOR TOR

^ CBI
R

i
i
6
 1:65

6
¼ 6 3:52 TORi TORj
4
 1:65


3:52 TORi TORk

1:65
TORj TORj

 1:65

3:52 TORj CBIk



1:65
TORk TORk

7
7
7
5

ð1:7Þ

where TORi, TORj and TORk represent the turnover rates as measures of
CBI for the initial three countries.
The larger sample of countries in the test include, Argentina, Chile, Egypt,
Greece, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru,
Turkey and Venezuela. Table Ib present results obtained from using RCBI as
deﬁned in (1.7) in a GLS procedure for the countries involved in the study.
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Table I. Results of the GML procedure employing (1.1) and (1.2) are as follows: (a) Generalized maximum likelihood estimates, (b) GLS estimates, (c) SUR estimates, (d) GLS estimates (ex-outliers), (e) SUR estimates (ex-outliers)
Country
(a)
Egypt
Colombia
India
(b)
Argentina
Chile
Egypt
Greece
Colombia
India
Indonesia
Israel
Mexico
Nigeria
Pakistan
Peru
Turkey
Venezuela
(c)
Argentina
Chile
Egypt
Greece
Colombia
India
Indonesia
Israel
Mexico
Nigeria
Pakistan
Peru
Turkey
Venezuela
(d)
Egypt
Greece
Colombia
India
Mexico
Nigeria
Pakistan
Turkey
Venezuela
(e)
Egypt
Greece
Colombia

ao

a1
7.46 (1.08)
32.92 (0.72)
3.05 (1.67)

)12.19** (4.01)
)83.76** (3.41)
6.3 (4.2)

)184 (3.69)
)23.88 (0.40)
3.92 (1.17)
)3.87 (0.08)
23.24 (0.28)
14.15 (0.58)
)74.44 (0.17)
)28.49 (1.11)
)26.03 (0.11)
29.09 (0.14)
69.61 (1.00)
)928.05 (1.17)
129.35 (1.32)
)27.86 (0.36)

233.96** (3.70)
83.88** (0.90)
)14.62 (0.74)
13.94** (0.89)
)76.34 (1.17)
)5.32 (1.59)
608.35** (0.97)
358.23** (1.18)
335.11** (1.26)
)117.26 (0.91)
)212.192 (3.18)
2369.22** (3.50)
)277.02 (2.96)
109.48** (1.50)

361.44
)28.15
5.09
2.21
30.52
9.77
)154.61
)34.85
)15.19
13.94
14.49
)642.44
77.20
4.28

(716.64)
(29.71)
(2.97)
(1.41)
(7.31)
(4.00)
(109.92)
(34.32)
(6.98)
(6.86)
(5.59)
(322.89)
(29.93)
(4.47)

)270.03 (702.39)
)17.52 (43.58)
0.66 (10.00)
8.56 (5.88)
)71.71 (29.27)
)9.43 (9.88)
984.92** (480.39)
462.94* (267.40)
186.19** (44.92)
)35.23 (35.70)
)35.05 (17.72)
1541.19 (949.95)
)140.76 (65.14)
)16.20 (15.00)

(0.74)
(0.54)
(5.03)
(1.41)
(1.35)
(3.61)
(0.44)
(0.15)
(0.07)

6.50** (0.35)
)6.90 (0.38)
5.22** (0.48)
2.50** (0.45)
1.38** (0.36)
)112.49 (3.62)
)465.04 (0.93)
)19.66 (0.76)
77.94** (0.72)

5.59 (3.09)
0.86 (1.51)
28.62 (7.74)

)5.80 (10.53)
15.84** (6.84)
)67.81 (30.00)

)3.67
0.25
265.91
25.54
)13.76
128.77
320.58
22.88
)4.24

a2
0.64 (0.09)
0.14 (0.04)
0.29 (0.15)
1.41
0.80
1.01
1.26
0.56
)0.55
0.19
0.68
0.02
0.32
0.09
5.10
0.65
0.47

(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.01)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.02) (0.01)

1.11
0.76
0.51
0.69
0.13
0.21
0.18
0.52
0.45
0.51
0.49
4.95
0.44
1.55

(0.28)
(0.08)
(0.10)
(0.07)
(0.15)
(0.12)
(0.18)
(0.14)
(0.11)
(0.14)
(0.09)
(0.20)
(0.13)
(0.21)

0.49
1.66
)83.88
)10.48
1.18
)1.22
0.14
0.70
0.69

(0.01)
(0.03)
(0.80)
(0.82)
(0.07)
(0.43)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)

0.64 (0.12)
0.67 (0.08)
0.20 (0.17)

b0

b1

)1.65 (0.14)

)3.52 (0.65)
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Table I. Continued
Country

ao

India
Mexico
Nigeria
Pakistan
Turkey
Venezuela

7.05
)8.51
15.62
18.80
59.03
0.16

(4.41)
(8.40)
(7.23)
(7.85)
(32.44)
(5.94)

a1

a2

)1.87 (11.19)
134.32** (59.16)
)52.43 (37.26)
)48.87 (24.72)
)102.61 (69.98)
)3.81 (20.93)

0.21
0.53
0.60
0.46
0.50
1.54

b0

b1

(0.12)
(0.15)
(0.16)
(0.11)
(0.14)
(0.31)

Standard Errors are in parentheses. Likelihood function value is )195.76 (Panel (a)).
*Positive and signiﬁcant at 10% level.
**Positive and signiﬁcant at 5% level.

Results of the GLS approach (Table Ib.) provide signiﬁcant support for
the inverse relationship between inﬂation and the measure of CBI in the
emerging economies in this study. In fact, eight out of the 14 countries in the
sample conﬁrm, at 5% signiﬁcant levels, the hypothesized tradeoﬀ between
CBI and inﬂation. The countries are Argentina, Chile, Greece, Indonesia,
Israel, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Even though standard errors are smaller
compared to the results of the SUR procedure, the relatively large coeﬃcients
call for some caution in the interpretation of the results. This may be due to
the inﬂuence of outliers like Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, Israel and Peru with
rather high inﬂation rates.7 Table Id provides results of the GLS test without
the afore-mentioned outliers. Five out of the nine countries involved provide
support, signiﬁcant at the conventional levels, for the expected CBI and
inﬂation tradeoﬀ. Mostly, the coeﬃcients and the corresponding standard
errors are relatively smaller suggesting improved estimates.
Using the SUR approach, results of the full sample which includes outliers
provide fewer conﬁrmation of the inverse relationship between inﬂation and
the measure of central bank independence (TOR). Speciﬁcally, Table Ic
shows that that six out of the fourteen countries displays evidence in support
of the expected inverse relationship between inﬂation rates and CBI. However, only two out of the six, Indonesia and Mexico, are signiﬁcant at the 5%
level and Israel at the 10%. The sizes of the estimates of the coeﬃcients are
also comparable to estimates of the GLS procedure though marginally
smaller in general. However, the standard errors of the estimates from the
SUR procedure are notably much larger than that of the GLS estimates.8 In
the test involving ex-outliers sample (Table Ie), SUR procedure resulted in
only two of the nine remaining countries, Greece and Mexico, providing
evidence in support of the inverse relationship between CBI and inﬂation
rates. As in the GLS procedure, SUR coeﬃcient estimates in the ex-outliers
sample are relatively smaller with lower standard errors compared to results
of the entire sample.
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7. Conclusion
Based on theoretical and empirical information available in the CBI
literature, this paper proposes two functional forms to predict the diagonal
and oﬀ-diagonal parameters of variance-covariance matrix in the estimation
process. The eﬀort here is to ﬁnd a way to better capture ex ante information
of the inverse relationship between CBI and inﬂation in the estimation process. The study involves 14 emerging economies. The study uses a generalized
maximum likelihood framework to obtain initial estimates of elements in a
residual covariance matrix for three countries. This matrix is used in a GLS
model on the whole sample of countries to test the relationship between
inﬂation and CBI. Results of the GLS model with the proposed functional
forms are compared to the outcome of an SUR model over the same period
and on the same countries. This boils down to a comparison of a model
(GLS) with a ‘restrictedÕ covariance matrix and speciﬁc deﬁnitions of
parameters based on ex ante CBI-inﬂation and an ‘unrestrictedÕ SUR model
with no such speciﬁc out-of-sample impositions.
First, using the GLS (restricted covariance) approach this study ﬁnds
stronger conﬁrmation of the inverse relationship between inﬂation and a
measure of CBI as compared to the SUR outcome. Under the GLS
approach, and based on the proposed functional forms (equations 1.1 and
1.2), eight out of the fourteen countries provide support at the 5% signiﬁcant
levels for the inﬂation – CBI tradeoﬀ (Table Ib). With respect to results from
the SUR model, even though six of the fourteen countries conﬁrm the CBI
and inﬂation tradeoﬀ, only three are signiﬁcant at the conventional levels.
Second, the standard errors associated with the GLS (restricted covariance) procedure are much smaller than the SUR estimates. This seems to
suggest that the GLS procedure is not so restrictive that it produces unreasonably in-accurate estimates. However, the large coeﬃcients seem to suggest
some caution in interpreting the parameter estimates. In an eﬀort to reduce
the undue inﬂuence of extreme values, four countries are identiﬁed as outliers
with large inﬂation rates and dropped from the next round of tests.
Table I(d and e) for GLS and SUR, respectively, show that results of GLS
procedure provide yet stronger evidence in support of the CBI-inﬂation
tradeoﬀ as compared to the SUR outcome. In fact the results of ex-outliers
sample for the GLS model show even smaller standard errors and ‘reasonablyÕ sized coeﬃcients.
The comparability of the results of GLS model based on the functional
forms this paper proposes to the SUR output suggest that, the GLS model
actually performs at least as well as methodologies employed in the existing
CBI literature. Also, relative to the SUR output, the GLS model provides
more accurate estimates. The collective result is that the GLS procedure
provides more convincing evidence in support of the hypothesized
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CBI-Inﬂation trade-oﬀ. This suggests that the functional forms used in GLS
model results in tighter and better representation and use of CBI indexes and
ex ante information in the estimation process. This contribution may also be
seen as part of the unfolding contemporary story on the relationship between
CBI measures and inﬂation rates.

Notes
1. Cukierman, A. 1992 MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
2. This investigation involved 8 OECD countries (Germany, Switzerland, U.S., Canada, Japan, France,
U.K., and Italy).
3. Designation of countries as emerging economies is based on the classiﬁcation by the International
Financial Corporation, a subsidiary of the World Bank (IFC, 1997).
4. rii, rjj and rij are all members of -ij, i.e. elements of S in equation (1.0).
5. With turnover rates (TOR) the higher it is the lower the level of independence of the central bank.
6. e f ðtori ,torj Þ natural exponential function to restrict variances to be positive.
7. Inﬂation rates in these countries ranged from over a 150 to more than 3000% (Argentina).
8. Explains the smaller number of signiﬁcant estimates.
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